| ERIC TURKILL WASHINGTON v. STATE of | | | | intoxicated driving conviction based solely on blood |
| MARYLAND | | | | alcohol content, as an alternative to the fact |
| COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND | | | | finder having to rely on the more subjective |
| January 28, 2010, Filed | | | | behavioral evidence necessary to prove |
| Appellant told the officer that he had had two | | | | intoxicated driving. Because the two offenses |
| beers. A second patrol officer, who responded | | | | are separate, the trial court was not required to |
| as backup, administered one of the three | | | | merge appellant's convictions for DUI and DUI per |
| standard field sobriety tests. Upon exiting his | | | | se. Indeed, appellant's trial counsel acknowledged |
| vehicle, appellant had a strong odor of alcohol on | | | | as much at sentencing, stating that "Count 3, the |
| his breath, his speech was very slurred, he was | | | | 21-902(a)(2), and the 21-902(a)(1), do not merge. |
| swaying, using the car for balance, and his steps | | | | They are distinct charges with separate |
| were uncoordinated. He claimed that he had | | | | elements." Nevertheless, whether appellant's DUI |
| taken an Oxycodone six hours earlier, that he | | | | per se sentence must be merged into his DUI |
| walked with a cane and that he did not feel | | | | sentence is an analytically separate question. That |
| comfortable performing the walk indicating a level | | | | is because, even when two offenses are |
| of alcohol intoxication that was way over the limit. | | | | separate under the required evidence test, in |
| Appellant was arrested and took an alcohol | | | | some circumstances multiple punishments may |
| breath test at the police station, resulting in a | | | | not be permitted in order to avoid a violation of |
| blood alcohol content reading of .25 more than | | | | the constitutional guarantee against double |
| three times the legal threshold of .08. Appellant | | | | jeopardy. In the instant case, we agree with |
| was convicted in the Circuit Court for Anne | | | | appellant that his sentences for DUI and DUI per |
| Arundel County of driving while under the | | | | se should have been merged under the rule of |
| influence of alcohol and driving while under the | | | | lenity. Appellant's position presents an issue of first |
| influence of alcohol per se, and sentenced to | | | | impression, because we have found no reported |
| consecutive terms of imprisonment. He appealed | | | | case addressing the propriety of consecutive |
| his consecutive sentences. | | | | sentences for DUI and DUI per se convictions |
| Issue: | | | | arising out of a single act of driving. In this case, |
| - Whether the imposition of consecutive | | | | the issue of sentencing merger is squarely |
| sentences upon conviction of DUI and DUI per se | | | | presented by the trial court's imposition of |
| is permitted? Whether DUI per se sentence | | | | consecutive sentences on the DUI conviction and |
| should have been merged into the DUI sentence? | | | | the DUI per se conviction. We hold that, when a |
| The Court held that the two are separate | | | | defendant is convicted of both DUI and DUI per |
| offenses under the required evidence test | | | | se, arising out of the same act of driving, the |
| because each has "an element not found in the | | | | lesser sentence, in this case the one for DUI per |
| other." In support of that interpretation, the | | | | se, merges into the greater sentence, in this case |
| Court reviewed legislative history leading to | | | | the sentence for DUI, under the rule of lenity. |
| enactment of the DUI per se provision in 1995, | | | | Therefore, we shall vacate the DUI per se |
| including materials from legislative committees, the | | | | sentence imposed on appellant. |
| Task Force on Drunk and Drugged Driving, and | | | | Disclaimer: |
| Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). The Court | | | | These summaries are provided by the SRIS Law |
| concluded that the legislative history established | | | | Group. They represent the firm's unofficial views |
| that DUI per se was enacted as a separate | | | | of the Justices' opinions. |
| offense in the statutory scheme to permit an | | | | |